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INTRODUCTION
Age, rather than death, has come to define the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.1 In three decisions over the last nine years, the
Court has significantly altered the criminal sentencing landscape by doling
out constitutional, categorical discounts on capital and noncapital
punishment for those who had not yet celebrated their eighteenth birthdays
at the time of their crimes.2 The Court rejected capital punishment for those
under eighteen,3 then life without parole in nonhomicide cases,4 and most
recently, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory
life without parole sentences.5 Each decision has turned on attributes, or
factors, inherent in youth that the Court has found make those under
eighteen less culpable for their crimes under the Eighth Amendment.6 They
1

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (“So if . . . death is different,
children are different too . . . . [I]t is no surprise that the law relating to society’s harshest
punishments recognizes such a distinction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the Court’s
‘Kids Are Different’ Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011)
(describing how the Court’s approach in Graham v. Florida “unceremoniously demolished
the Hadrian’s Wall that has separated its ‘death is different’ jurisprudence from non-capital
sentencing review since 1972” and, in its place, “fortified an expansive ‘kids are different’
jurisprudence”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine in: The
Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 81 (2010) (“Justice
Kennedy [in Graham] thus managed to transform what had looked like a capital versus
noncapital line, the application of which rendered noncapital challenges essentially hopeless,
into a categorical rule versus individual sentence line . . . .”).
2
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Each of these decisions followed Atkins v. Virginia, which
held executing mentally retarded criminals to be cruel and unusual punishment due to the
offenders’ reduced capacity and the executions’ failure to serve social justifications
recognized for the death penalty. See 536 U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002).
3
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
4
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
5
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
The Court considered Miller along with
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647), which also presented the question
of whether a juvenile’s sentence of life without parole violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460–62.
6
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at
569–70).
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include offenders’ (1) lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, (2) vulnerability to negative influences and limited control
over their environment, and (3) lack of characters that can be rehabilitated.7
These factors have not been surmised simply from precedent or
common sense. Rather, the Court has relied on scientific and sociological
studies to support its finding that these three characteristics are inherent
among those under eighteen,8 reduce that group’s culpability, and
accordingly reduce the punishments that society can justly impose.9 But the
Court’s reliance on such evidence overextends its usefulness.
Neuroscientific and psychological data on which the Court has relied does
not identify a bright-line age at which these three factors no longer lessen
culpability.10
Their resulting impact on penological justifications
supporting legitimate punishment, which have also been central to the
Court’s holdings, similarly does not hinge on an offender having a
particular number of candles on his birthday cake. The Court itself has
previously recognized the shallow truth of age, holding youth to be “more
than a chronological fact” and instead “a time and condition of life when a
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage.”11 Still, since Roper v. Simmons, the Court has resolved to
categorically and increasingly mitigate punishment based on youthfulness
via the Eighth Amendment only when offenders are under eighteen. While

7
Id. The Court Bellotti v. Baird had posited a similar but distinguishable list of reasons
for treating children differently from adults, including: (1) “the peculiar vulnerability of
children,” (2) “their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,” and
(3) “the importance of the parental role in child rearing.” See 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979)
(concerning a law restricting the right of a minor to obtain an abortion).
8
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
9
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 2034; Roper, 543 U.S.
at 569, 570, 578.
10
A brief offering up scientific evidence for the Court, for example, recognized its own
limitations. See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6 n.3, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)
(“[S]cience cannot, of course, draw bright lines precisely demarcating the boundaries
between childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.”); see also Sara B. Johnson et al.,
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in
Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 218 (2009) (“[N]euroimaging
studies do not allow a chronologic cut-point for behavioral or cognitive maturity at either the
individual or population level.”). For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.
11
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). For this reason, the Court
required lower courts to also consider “the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant.” Id. at 116.
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the Court in Roper acknowledged and discounted the limitations of its
bright-line rule,12 the Miller Court did not address the issue.
This Comment aims to seize on the Miller Court’s silence and
demonstrate the inequity in drawing a bright line at eighteen for considering
youthfulness in mitigating punishment under the Court’s logic. Given both
the scientific impossibility of identifying a precise age at which
characteristics of youthfulness cease, and the Court’s repeated recognition
that these very factors impact culpability and preclude just punishment,13
the current approach cannot stand. Instead, this Comment argues that if the
way to address the increasingly punitive orientation of criminal justice
remains one of protecting youthful defendants through the Eighth
Amendment, then the same consideration of youthfulness that has been
deemed constitutionally relevant for those under eighteen must also be
available for equally youthful14 defendants over eighteen to assert when
they face equally harsh and irrevocable sentences.
While considerable literature discusses sentencing policy for young
offenders, this Comment focuses on the Supreme Court’s trio of categorical
decisions to examine the justifications for a bright-line rule and, ultimately,
to lend support for defendants’ abilities to seek out the mitigating force of
youthfulness up to age twenty-five. By continuing to categorically exclude
those over eighteen in homage to society’s traditional demarcation point of
adulthood, the Court loses sight of the exceptionality of criminal
punishment compared to other rights-allocating areas of the law, such as
voting. Furthermore, setting a bright line at eighteen unjustly disregards
offenders over eighteen who, in many instances, would likewise be deemed
less responsible under the scheme of justifications the Court has set forth.
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Comment provides
background regarding the relationship between youthfulness and
culpability. First, it sketches its historical foundations, describing both the
12

In Roper, the Court reasoned that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults
do not disappear when an individual turns 18,” but “[t]he age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.” 543 U.S. at 574.
13
In Miller, the Court articulated its most recent affirmation that the factors are of
central import for sentencing judges and juries to consider in arriving at appropriate,
proportional punishment. See 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
14
This Comment uses the term “youthful” to describe those who possess the
characteristics that the Court has relied on in Roper, Graham, and Miller to mitigate
punishment. In addition, whereas other writers have opted to distinguish between “children”
and “adults,” using the age of eighteen as a boundary, this Comment adopts the terms
“youth” and “young people” to describe those individuals who are no longer children and not
yet fully functioning adults. Kenneth Keniston referred to the period between adolescence
and adulthood as “youth” in 1970. Kenneth Keniston, Youth: A “New” Stage of Life, 39
AM. SCHOLAR 631, 635 (1970). Scholars today continue to redefine this transitional period.
See infra Part II.A.
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early common law infancy defense and the rise and fall of the rehabilitative
juvenile justice model. Second, it describes the biological underpinnings of
youthfulness that have been documented through psychological and
neuroscientific study. Third, it shows how the Supreme Court has given
this evidence Eighth Amendment significance.
Part II then raises three key issues with the Court’s bright line at
eighteen. It highlights the lack of scientific support for a categorical line,
describes the Court’s improper comparison to other rights-allocating areas
of the law, and demonstrates how penological justifications for punishment
can be similarly undermined for youthful defendants over eighteen.
Finally, Part III argues that the Court should make the mitigating effect
of youthfulness available to youthful offenders between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-five by recasting its categorical line as a presumption. Under
such a scheme, defendants up to eighteen years old would be irrebuttably
presumed youthful, while defendants between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five could seek to show that they meet the Court’s “youthful”
criterion and likewise deserve protection from irrevocable sentences.
I. BACKGROUND
A. CENTURIES OF RECOGNIZING THE IMPACT OF YOUTHFULNESS ON
CULPABILITY

The correlative relationship between youthfulness and culpability has
long been recognized through the concept of infancy.15 By the seventeenth
century, English common law held that children under the age of seven
could not be punished for any crime.16 Those aged seven and under were
irrebuttably presumed to lack the mental capacity to form the criminal
intent necessary for justly imposing punishment.17 While individuals

15

For an informative discussion of the origins of the infancy defense, see Francis Bowes
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1007–10 (1932).
16
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22–23; 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 27 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 1800) (1736). English law
regarding age and criminal responsibility borrowed from Roman civil law, which divided
“minors”—generally those under age twenty-one or twenty-five—into general stages, such
as infantia (birth until age seven), pueritia proxima (seven to fourteen), and pubertas (above
age fourteen). See 1 HALE, supra, at 16–19. Ecclesiastical courts and Roman civil courts
had previously established seven as “the age of reason,” finding it to be the age at which a
child could lose innocence, be guilty of sin, and be criminally liable for his behavior. See
MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN 36–37 (2006).
17
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 27–28; see also
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4 (5th ed.
1671) (noting that the principal end of punishment, deterrence, is not served when infants are
below the “age of discretion”).
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between ages seven and thirteen were additionally presumed incapable of
forming that intent,18 proof that the child knew his act was wrong could
rebut the presumption.19 After the U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted, the
common law rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit felonies for
youth between ages seven and thirteen remained in force, but “adult”
punishments, such as execution, could theoretically be imposed on anyone
over the age of seven.20
These gradations based on age reflected the importance of a guilty
conscience for criminal punishment. To constitute a complete crime,
“cognizable by human laws,” Blackstone wrote, “there must be, first, a
vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious
will.”21 If a jury confronted a defendant incapable of committing a felony,
Sir Matthew Hale advised that it could find that he committed the act but
was not of sound mind, or that he could not discern between good and
evil.22 Determining culpability in this way reflected the understanding that
developmental differences prevented very young offenders from forming
criminal intent.23 When offenders then passed the minimum threshold of
competence, their diminished responsibility could still render them less
culpable.24 Defendants aged seven to fourteen were presumed to possess a
natural incapacity to be guilty of crimes, which the state could rebut upon

18
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 26–27 (noting an
even greater presumption for those under twelve).
19
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; CORRIERO, supra note 16, at 37. While the
rebuttable presumption recognized that some children matured more quickly than others, it
also served the policy interest of punishing children who committed particularly atrocious
acts, regardless of their immaturity. See CORRIERO, supra note 16, at 37.
20
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); see also Julian W. Mack, The Chancery
Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 310, 310 (Jane
Addams ed., 1925); Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply
the Want of Years, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 316 (2011); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for
Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While
Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 616 (1983) (“Seven children were executed
prior to 1800 and 95 prior to 1900, the youngest aged ten years.”).
21
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *21 (“[A]n unwarrantable act without a vicious will
is no crime at all.”); see also 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 38 (“[I]t is the will and intention, that
regularly is required, as well as the act and event, to make [an] offense capital.”).
22
See 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 27.
23
See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility,
and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 100 (1997).
24
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 55–56, 57 (2005) (“[E]ven
after a youth passes the minimum threshold of competence that leads to a finding of capacity
to commit crimes, the barely competent youth is not as culpable and therefore not as
deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully qualified adult offender.”); Lerner,
supra note 20, at 317.
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individualized determinations of capacity.25 For this group of defendants,
therefore, “[t]he capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt,” as Blackstone
put it, was “not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of
the delinquent’s understanding and judgment.”26
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, recognition of youth
developmental differences took on a new character.
Progressive
reformers,27 animated by worsening household conditions and scholarly
reconceptualization of childhood,28 sought to establish separate courts to
adjudicate young offenders29—sometimes as old as twenty-one.30 The new
courts’ aim was to treat young offenders rather than punish them. 31 As
such, a concern for youth welfare took precedence over concerns with their
offenses.32 The courts exercised states’ parens patriae authority33 to
25

See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; see also Lerner, supra note 20, at 317.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23.
27
Reformers in this period are commonly called “child savers.” See, e.g., MICHAEL B.
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA
118–20 (1986); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3
(2d ed. 1977).
28
See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
693–94 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]; see also Michael Grossberg, Changing
Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820–1935, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 3, 22–25 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (attributing family problems,
such as rising divorce and escalating juvenile delinquency, to economic structural changes
and noting that new understandings of child development produced concerns about child
vulnerability). Works emphasizing the naturalness of children—such as that written by Jean
Jacques Rousseau and Johann Pestalozzi, along with the works of G. Stanley Hall and
Friedrich Froebel—influenced reformers. See ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL
CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
AMERICA 11, 80 (1998).
29
In 1899, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the world’s first juvenile court law, the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 405 (West 2010)). See BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 30 (1993). Other states followed. See id. Within the decade after Illinois passed its
law, ten states established children’s courts, and by 1925, all but two states had established
specialized courts. See id.
30
Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to Be Punished: Some
Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182, 191 (1989) (“The juvenile
court movement assumed that young people under an articulated statutory age (sometimes as
high as 21 years of age) are incapable of rational decisionmaking and thus lack the capacity
for moral accountability assumed by the punitive model.”).
31
See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 28, at 42, 42; see also Karen Clanton, At the Helm: The Presiding Judges of the
Juvenile Court, in A NOBLE SOCIAL EXPERIMENT? THE FIRST 100 YEARS OF THE COOK
COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 1899–1999, at 74, 74 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee ed., 1999).
32
See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909) (“The
problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a specific
26
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emphasize treatment, supervision, and control in place of traditional,
punitive criminal procedures.34 Because punishment and blameworthiness
largely had no place in this rehabilitative model of justice, issues regarding
youthfulness and culpability received little attention for much of the
twentieth century.35
That changed by the late 1980s with skyrocketing juvenile crime rates.
Between 1980 and 1994, the number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses
climbed 64% and juvenile arrests for murder specifically jumped 99%.36
Media coverage of crime also exploded,37 and state legislatures responded
in near universality.38 Over a period of just three years from 1992 to 1995,
forty states enacted laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult

wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.”).
33
First asserted in the United States in a juvenile proceeding in Ex parte Crouse, 4
Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839), the parens patriae authority justifies governmental intervention in
the lives of individuals who are unable to care for themselves. See Donna M. Bishop &
Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities
with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 127 n.7 (2007).
34
See Mack, supra note 32, at 120 (arguing that “ordinary trappings” of criminal court
are out of place in juvenile hearings, and the judge should sit “with the child at his side,
where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him”); see
also Feld, Transformation, supra note 28, at 695.
35
See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
547, 591 (2000).
36
JEFFREY BUTTS & JEREMY TRAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN YOUTH
VIOLENCE: 1980 TO 2000, at 2 (2002), available at http://goo.gl/N1uGQy. From just 1984 to
1993, the juvenile arrest rate for murder increased 167% from a rate of 5 arrests per 100,000
juveniles to 14 per 100,000. Id.; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1996 UPDATE ON
VIOLENCE 14–15 (1996) (discussing the arrest rate trend beginning in the late 1980s and
noting that “[i]f trends continue . . . juvenile arrests for violent crime will more than double
by the year 2010”).
37
See Network News in the Nineties: The Top Topics and Trends of the Decade, MEDIA
MONITOR (Ctr. for Media & Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.), July/Aug. 1997, at 1–3.
Between 1990 and 1997, one out of every ten stories on network evening news dealt with
crime, climbing from 830 stories during 1992 to 2,574 during 1995. See id. at 2. At the
same time, fear of crime increased dramatically, particularly in urban areas. See Daniel
Romer et al., Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime, 53 J. COMM. 88, 95
(2003).
38
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 11–13 (1998). This universal
urge to legislate, according to Professor Zimring, suggests a “disturbing” model of legal
reform. Absent a showing of deficiency in the current legal institutions’ abilities to deal with
violence, “[l]egislative changes that are based solely on concern about high offense rates are
vulnerable to error in a special way.” Id. at 12.
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criminal court,39 and forty-seven states and the District of Columbia made
changes in their laws concerning juvenile crime.40 Although many
observers mark the beginning of the end of the traditional juvenile court
decades earlier when the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, spiking
juvenile crime rates further upended support for rehabilitative ideals41 and
amassed calls of “adult time” for “adult crime”42—especially as fear swirled
regarding an entirely different breed of so-called super-predators.43 Taken
together, the new legislative schemes represented a “fundamental shift” in
juvenile justice away from rehabilitating offenders and toward punishing

39

PATRICIA TORBERT ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3
(1996), available at http://goo.gl/2b5ZK2.
40
See id. at 59. Professor Feld situates this “get tough” era of juvenile justice in a
broader context dating back to the 1960s when rehabilitation was replaced by a paradigm of
just deserts, penal proportionality, and determinate sentences. Barry C. Feld, A Century of
Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189,
207–13 (2007).
41
See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 8–9
(2008); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,
137 (1998). The Supreme Court in In re Gault extended to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings some of the same constitutional rights to which defendants in criminal
proceedings are entitled, including the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination. See 387 U.S. 1, 41, 55 (1967). Critics of the decision, including Justice
Potter Stewart, argued it “serve[d] to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal
prosecution” and thereby “invite[d] a long step backwards into the nineteenth century.” Id.
at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Keynote Address: Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth
Crime, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337, 351 n.54 (2006). While the slogan appealed to retributive
instincts, it also suggested that serious violence is not a characteristic of childhood but “is
somehow adult.” See ZIMRING, supra note 38, at 9.
43
Some politicians, scholars, and media in the mid-1990s used the term “superpredators” to describe an impending generation of violent young offenders. See, e.g.,
Hearings on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Before the Subcomm. on
Early Childhood, Youth and Families of the H. Economic and Educational Opportunities
Comm., 104th Cong. 90 (1996) (statement of Rep. William McCollum, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Crime, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the
Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23; Bob Dole, Weekly Republican
Radio Address (July 6, 1996), available at http://goo.gl/396Swt (“Unless something is done
soon, some of today’s newborns will become tomorrow’s ‘super predators’—merciless
criminals capable of committing the most vicious of acts for the most trivial reasons . . . .”).
For others, the fact that the phenomenon never materialized, Gary Marx, Young Killers
Remain Well-Publicized Rarity, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1998, § 1, at A1, was unsurprising, see
Franklin E. Zimring, Crying Wolf Over Teen Demons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at B5.
But see Steve Drizin, Trayvon and the Myth of the ‘Juvenile Superpredator,’ HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 17, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://goo.gl/qnhzy6 (suggesting that even though “the
superpredators never arrived,” still, “urban legends die hard”).
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them.44 Over the coming several years, however, many began to question
whether the “get-tough” laws and increasingly “adult” punishments were
actually making the public safer.45
B. FINDING YOUTHFULNESS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE

As public debate surrounding youth prosecutions swelled, some
researchers looked toward youth development with renewed interest.46 In
the decades laying bare the promise of the rehabilitative juvenile justice
model, both developmental psychologists and neuroscientists exploring the
practice of brain imaging honed in on changes in brain composition and
behavior occurring between adolescence and adulthood.
Psychologists identified a number of important distinctive qualities
attributable to youth. For example, psychologists found early adolescence
to be accompanied by increased susceptibility to peer pressure.47
Adolescents were also found to attach more weight to short-term
consequences,48 and they did not extend projections for consequences as far

44

See TORBERT ET AL., supra note 39, at xi.
See, e.g., Maya Bell, A Child, A Crime—An Adult Punishment, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Oct. 21, 1999, at A-1 (“Research is thin, but every study on the subject, including the most
thorough one conducted at the University of Florida, has shown that young offenders sent to
adult prison commit more serious crimes quicker and more often after their releases than
similar offenders who remain in the juvenile system.”); Barbara White Stack, Law Giving
Juveniles Adult Time Under Fire, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 2001, at B-1 (“Two
state senators . . . say it’s time to investigate whether the 5-year-old ‘adult time for adult
crime’ law in Pennsylvania has lived up to its promise . . . .”); Tina Susman, Doubting the
System, NEWSDAY, Aug. 21, 2002, at A6.
46
See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn from Child
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 33 (2009). The MacArthur Foundation, for
example, convened a group to study adolescent development and funded extensive research
about effective juvenile crime policy. See id.
47
See Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents,
15 DEV. PSYCHOL. 608, 608, 615 (1979) (studying youth in third, sixth, ninth, eleventh, and
twelfth grades and finding conformity to peers to increase between third and ninth grade, and
then decline); Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in
Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841, 843, 848 (1986) (studying children in fifth, sixth,
eighth, and ninth grades and noting that by ninth grade, the proportion of peer-oriented
children leveled off); see also Scott & Grisso, supra note 41, at 162.
48
See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 66 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); see also
Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEV.
REV. 339, 366–67 (1992) (concluding that high levels of reckless behavior during
adolescence implicate developmental roots in sensation seeking and adolescent egocentrism,
declining after adolescence—perhaps due to biology, increased maturity, and young people
assuming greater responsibilities); Scott & Grisso, supra note 41, at 164.
45
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into the future as did older youth.49 Psychologists additionally discovered
evidence suggesting that adolescents may be driven more by rewards and
less by risks than “adults” are.50 Moreover, psychologists found empirical
support for the theory on adolescence first articulated by Erik Erikson, 51
which suggested that moving into adulthood involved changes in the way
young people formed their identities.52
In the field of neuroscience, research began to depict adolescence as a
period of continued brain growth and change. A pair of neuroimaging
studies in 1999, for instance, showed continued development through
adolescence of the brain’s frontal lobe53—essential for such functions as
anticipating consequences, planning, and controlling impulses.54 Gray
matter in the frontal lobe was shown to spike just prior to adolescence55 and

49

See A.L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things
Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 102, 108–09 (1986) (studying ninth
graders, twelfth graders, and college sophomores).
50
See Leon Mann et al., Adolescent Decision-Making: The Development of Competence,
12 J. ADOLESCENCE 265, 275 (1989) (“[O]ur analysis of the modest evidence leads us to
conclude that by age 15 years many adolescents have achieved a reasonable level of
competence . . . . However, like all humans, adolescents do not consistently behave as
competent decision makers . . . .”). But see Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in
Adolescence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 1, 38 (1992) (“Our review of
the empirical evidence on risk taking and of the literature on cognitive development and
decision-making skills has found mixed results regarding the degree to which adolescents
may be taking more risks than other age levels.”).
51
See Alan S. Waterman, Identity Development from Adolescence to Adulthood: An
Extension of Theory and a Review of Research, 18 DEV. PSYCHOL. 341, 346, 355 (1982) (“It
is during the college years that the greatest gains in identity formation appear to occur.”).
52
For an articulation of Professor Erikson’s theory, see generally ERIK H. ERIKSON,
IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (W.W. Norton & Co. 1980) (1959); ERIK H. ERIKSON,
IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968). Professor Erikson artfully described adolescence as “a
vital regenerator in the process of social evolution.” ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS,
supra, at 134.
53
Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A
Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et
al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions,
2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999). These studies used 3D image mapping
techniques, whereas early quantitative structural brain-imaging studies in the late 1980s and
early 1990s could not assess density. See Arthur W. Toga et al., Mapping Brain Maturation,
29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 148, 149 (2006).
54
See Adam Ortiz, Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, A.B.A. JUV.
JUST. CTR., Jan. 2004, at 1, available at http://goo.gl/b98tT2; see also Inside the Teenage
Brain: Interview: Jay Giedd, PBS FRONTLINE (2002), http://goo.gl/IeSz3u (“The frontal lobe
is often called the CEO, or the executive of the brain. . . . It’s a part of the brain that most
separates man from beast, if you will.”).
55
See Giedd et al., supra note 53, at 861 (finding gray matter to increase to maximum
sizes around the ages of twelve and eleven for males and females respectively).
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then decrease between adolescence and early adulthood56 in a process
known as pruning. Like sculpting a tree, pruning mirrors “cutting back
branches [to] stimulate[] health and growth.”57 The gray matter reduction is
accompanied by a white matter increase.58 Through the cellular maturation
process known as myelination, white matter development is said to improve
cognitive functioning.59 Because the samples for these studies were limited
in age, however, they could not support conclusions about the endpoint of
brain maturation.60 When a team of neuroscientists finally mapped the
trajectory of brain maturation using a sample of individuals ranging in age
from seven to eighty-seven, they observed gray matter density changes
continuing beyond adolescence into adulthood.61
Psychology professors Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott
adopted the thrust of these and other emerging neuroscientific studies
showing brain maturation to continue into early adulthood as part of their
influential 2003 article, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence.62 Combined
with psychological research, discoveries regarding the brain systems
implicated in judgment and impulse control provided the basis for
Professors Steinberg and Scott’s argument that youth should not be held to
the adult standard of criminal responsibility.63 The authors, renowned in

56

See id. at 861–62; Sowell et al., supra note 53, at 860.
Ortiz, supra note 54, at 2.
58
See id.
59
See Sowell et al., supra note 53, at 860. For additional general descriptions of brain
development, see, for example, Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of
Youth: Implications for Juvenile Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 428,
433 (2011); Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 56.
60
See Toga et al., supra note 54, at 150–51; see also Giedd et al., supra note 53, at 861
(finding gray matter to decrease following adolescence through age twenty-two, the oldest
age of those studied); Sowell et al., supra note 53, at 860 (finding loss of gray matter to
continue up to age thirty, the oldest age of those studied).
61
See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the Human Life Span,
6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 309, 309–10 (2003). Other researchers have reached similar
conclusions. See Catherine Lebel & Christian Beaulieu, Longitudinal Development of
Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE
10937, 10938, 10943 (“[W]e show within-subject brain development during young
adulthood in association tracts, particularly frontal connections needed for complex
cognitive tasks such as inhibition, executive functioning, and attention.”) (studying subjects
aged 5.6 to 29.3 years old); see also Melinda Beck, Delayed Development: 20-Somethings
Blame the Brain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2012, at D1; Tony Cox, Brain Maturity Extends Well
Beyond Teen Years (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 10, 2011), available at
http://goo.gl/LWW77k.
62
See generally Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003).
63
See id. at 1011–13.
57
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their fields, asserted that youth culpability should be mitigated for those
under eighteen due to adolescents’ diminished decisionmaking capacities,
their relatively lower ability to resist coercive influences, and the fact that
their characters still undergo change.64
Although the professors
acknowledged that “we are a long way from comprehensive scientific
understanding in this area, and research findings are unlikely to ever be
sufficiently precise to draw a chronological age boundary between those
who have adult decision-making capacity and those who do not,”65 they
concluded that sufficient evidence mandated a change in juvenile
punishment.66
C. ATTAINING EIGHTH AMENDMENT SIGNIFICANCE

1. Roper v. Simmons
In 2005, psychological and neuroscientific evidence-based
explanations for youthfulness found their way into Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The Court for the first time endorsed scientific findings
relating to human development in support of reducing youth culpability in
Roper v. Simmons, the case of a teenager sentenced to capital punishment
for murder.67 Christopher Simmons sought postconviction relief after the
Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,68 holding executing a mentally
retarded person to be unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
Despite the grisly details of his crime,69 Simmons argued that the same
reasoning in Atkins prohibited the execution of a juvenile who committed
his crime when he was younger than eighteen.70 The Supreme Court

64

See id. at 1009.
Id. at 1016.
66
Id. at 1017.
67
543 U.S. 551 (2005). The importance of the Court injecting science into its reasoning
was not lost on commentators. See Bishop & Farber, supra note 33, at 125 (“Although
Roper will always be best known as the case that abolished the juvenile death penalty in
America, the decision is at least equally noteworthy for its endorsement and application of
scientific findings relating to adolescent developmental immaturity.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The
Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience Is Transforming the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
48, 51 (Mar. 11, 2007) (“[Justice Kennedy’s] indirect reference to the scientific studies in the
briefs led some supporters and critics to view the decision as the Brown v. Board of
Education of neurolaw.”).
68
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
69
Simmons—and a friend, who was fifteen at the time—broke into a woman’s home,
bound her eyes and mouth, then drove to a state park, reinforced her bindings, and threw her
from a bridge, drowning her. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 556–57. Disturbingly, Simmons
assured his friends they could “get away with it” because they were minors. See id. at 556.
70
Id. at 559.
65

680

KELSEY B. SHUST

[Vol. 104

reconsidered precedent and agreed.71 In an opinion written by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the objective indicia of consensus
then provided sufficient evidence that society views juveniles as
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”72 Juveniles up to
the age of eighteen, according to the Court, comprise a certain class of
offenders for which the death penalty may not be imposed.73 Because
Roper extended to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds the same protection that
Thompson v. Oklahoma provided for those under sixteen, the greatest
significance of the Court’s opinion might have come not from what the
Court said, but how it said it.
Specifically, in describing the class of offenders to whom capital
punishment can no longer be imposed, the Court relied on three differences
between “juveniles under 18” and “adults”—lacking maturity, being
vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, and not having as
well-formed characters.74 These findings, according to the Court, reflected
both what “any parent knows” and what scientific and sociological studies
tend to confirm.75 As a result of these characteristics, young offenders were
held to be less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes, less
likely to be deterred by the prospect of death sentences, and less likely to be
irretrievably depraved.76
While the Roper Court differentiated “juveniles under 18” from
“adults,” it acknowledged the limitation of such a categorization. Justice
Kennedy wrote, “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not

71
See id. at 559–60. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court rejected an opportunity to rule
out capital punishment for defendants over fifteen but under the age of eighteen. 492 U.S.
361, 377–78 (1989). Justice Antonin Scalia, questioning petitioner’s evidence-based
argument, wrote: “petitioners and their supporting amici marshal an array of socioscientific
evidence concerning the psychological and emotional development of 16- and 17-year-olds.
If such evidence could conclusively establish the entire lack of deterrent effect and moral
responsibility, resort to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would be
unnecessary . . . .” Id. While Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the 5–4 Court,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did not join this part. See id. at 380–82.
72
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567–68 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (relying on evidence that a majority of states rejected the juvenile death penalty, it
was used infrequently, and a trend toward abolishment existed).
73
See id. at 568. Roper extended the protection to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds that
Thompson v. Oklahoma provided for those under sixteen. See 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
74
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
75
Id. at 569. The Court cited Arnett, supra note 48, at 339, for the first finding;
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 62, at 1014, for the second finding; and ERIKSON, IDENTITY:
YOUTH AND CRISIS, supra note 52, for the third finding.
76
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71. These arguments regarding retribution and
blameworthiness mirror those the Court rejected in Stanford v. Kentucky. See 492 U.S. 361,
377–78 (1989).
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disappear when an individual turns 18.”77 Still, the Court insisted upon
drawing a bright line for ruling out the death penalty as disproportionate
punishment, looking beyond criminal punishment to suggest a national
consensus fitting within the Eighth Amendment rubric. Since eighteen is
“where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood,” the Court concluded, so too it is where “the line for death
eligibility ought to rest.”78 The Court thus rejected an individualized
standard of culpability based on youthfulness in favor of a categorical rule
to protect all offenders below the age of eighteen.
2. Graham v. Florida
The Court cemented its bright line for mitigating unduly harsh
punishment in Graham. There the Court considered a challenge to a
mandatory life sentence for a seventeen-year-old who committed a pair of
nonhomicide felonies.79 In another opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the
Court found that Terrance Jamar Graham’s life-without-parole punishment
constituted cruel and unusual punishment based on three related concerns:
(1) the offender’s limited culpability, (2) the particular severity of life
imprisonment without parole, and (3) the failure of penological theories of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation to justify such
punishment.80
For the first consideration, the Graham Court relied on Roper’s
holding that juveniles are less culpable and therefore less deserving of the
most severe punishments because they lack maturity, are more vulnerable to
negative influences and outside pressures, and their characters are not as
well-formed.81 The Court also noted that no “recent data” provided a

77

Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
Id. The majority noted that its rule might be overinclusive. Some members of the
protected class likely had “attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.” Id.
Underinclusivity, however, was not a concern.
79
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010). Police learned that Terrance
Jamar Graham robbed several homes while he was on probation for armed burglary and
attempted armed robbery. See id. at 2018–20. The trial court revoked Graham’s probation
and sentenced him to life in prison. See id. at 2020.
80
See id. at 2026–30.
81
Id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). The Graham Court continued:
78

These salient characteristics mean that it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. Accordingly, juvenile
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. A juvenile is not
absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression is not as morally reprehensible as
that of an adult.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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reason for the Court to reconsider Roper’s sociological and scientific
observations.82 Instead, further developments in psychology and brain
science continued to show “fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds,”83 including that “parts of the brain involved in behavior
control continue to mature through late adolescence.”84
For the second consideration regarding the severity of life without
parole, the Court acknowledged the reality of passing time. Life-withoutparole sentences already constitute “the second most severe penalty
permitted by law.”85 Furthermore, under sentences of life without parole,
younger offenders generally serve more years and greater percentages of
their lives behind bars than adults.86 Consequently, the Court noted that
imposing such punishments on younger offenders was especially harsh.87
Finally, the Graham Court considered penological justifications for
juvenile sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses.
Weaving many of Roper’s developmental findings into its analysis, the
Court found that none of the goals of punishment provided adequate
justification for sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without
parole.88 The Court ruled out retribution (because of offenders’ reduced
moral culpability),89 deterrence (because of their impetuousness),90
incapacitation (because of offenders’ capacity for change),91 and
rehabilitation (because life without parole forswears any potential
rehabilitation).92 Finding no legitimate justification for Graham’s sentence,
the Court found that it was by its nature disproportionate and failed to pass
Eighth Amendment muster.93
3. Miller v. Alabama
The Court extended its reliance on youth developmental differences
even further in Miller, which concerned two cases of fourteen-year-olds
82

See id.
Id.
84
Id. (citation omitted).
85
Id. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
86
Id. at 2028 (“A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole
receive the same punishment in name only. This reality cannot be ignored.” (internal
citations omitted)).
87
See id.
88
See id. at 2028–31.
89
Id. at 2028.
90
Id. at 2028–29.
91
Id. at 2029.
92
Id. at 2029–30.
93
See id. at 2030.
83
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mandatorily sentenced to life in prison without parole for their involvement
in murders.94 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
mandatory sentencing schemes that do not allow judges or juries to consider
the mitigating characteristics of youth, as precedent established that
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.”95
Here again, the Court relied upon the distinct developmental qualities
of youth that render young offenders less culpable and impair penological
justifications for their punishment.96 But this time, the Court did not rely on
national consensus against the punishment or find reason to limit its holding
to specific types of crimes.97 Rather, the Court melded Roper and
Graham’s focus on prohibiting severe punishments based on certain
offenders’ reduced culpability with other precedent that requires sentencing
authorities to consider defendants’ characteristics in doling out the most
severe punishments.98 In so doing, the Court noted that the “distinctive
(and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities” of youth
were hardly crime-specific.99 In addition, it noted that life-without-parole
sentences should be treated as akin to capital punishment when the
offenders are young.100 Because youth matters in determining whether an
irrevocable sentence is appropriate, the Court held that “a judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before
imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”101

94

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen when
he robbed a video store with two friends, one of whom shot the clerk when she threatened to
call police. Id. at 2461. Evan Miller was fourteen when he and a friend smoked marijuana
and drank with a neighbor. Id. at 2462. When the neighbor passed out, Miller tried to steal
his wallet, but the neighbor awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat. See id. Miller and his
friend beat him with a baseball bat then set his trailer on fire, killing him. See id. An
Arkansas statute mandated life in prison without parole for Jackson, who was convicted of
capital murder, and Alabama law prescribed the punishment for Miller’s conviction for
murder in the course of arson. See id. at 2461, 2462–63.
95
Id. at 2464. The Court’s holding turned on finding that mandatory sentencing schemes
pose “too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” because they make “youth (and all
that accompanies it) irrelevant” to the imposition of the harshest prison sentence and can
weaken rationales for punishment. Id. at 2469.
96
See id. at 2464–65.
97
See id. at 2465, 2470–71. Although the majority opinion provides some argument
regarding “objective indicia,” id. at 2471–73, the crux of its holding relied on individualized
sentencing precedent, id. at 2471, 2472 n.11.
98
See id. at 2463.
99
Id. at 2465.
100
Id. at 2466.
101
Id. at 2475.
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Despite its lofty phrasing about the importance of youth in sentencing,
Miller firmly cabined its holding to those under the age of eighteen.102
Lower courts following Miller unsurprisingly do the same. Rather than
embracing Miller’s appeal for individualized sentencing before the harshest
possible penalties can be imposed, they cling to the hardline dichotomy
between “juvenile” and “adult” offenders. For example, a Florida court of
appeals tersely rejected the petition of a defendant who was nineteen when
he committed his crime.103 To the extent that the petitioner asked the
Florida court to expand Graham and Miller “to other ‘youthful offenders’
under the age of 21,” the court noted it was “bound by the pronouncements
of the Supreme Court of the United States.”104 Several other courts
following the earlier decisions in Roper and Graham similarly invoked the
Supreme Court’s bright line to reject young adults’ Eighth Amendment
claims.105 The following Part illustrates why the reasoning underpinning
Roper, Graham, and Miller requires courts to allow defendants up to age
twenty-five to present evidence in mitigation about their youth at the time
of their crimes.
II. DISCUSSION
While the Court for decades has considered youth to be less culpable
and recently invoked science to support a new era in that tradition, it refuses
to recognize that young people just over the chronological age of eighteen
might similarly be less culpable. Yet, the Court recognizes that that age is
an imperfect proxy for diminished culpability. The Roper majority stated

102

Id. at 2460.
Janvier v. State, No. 4D13-1695, slip op. at 1–2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013); see
also Wilcox v. Rozum, No. 13-3761, 2013 WL 6731906, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013);
People v. Riley, No. 4-12-0225, 2013 WL 936435, at *11 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 8, 2013);
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). In Cintora, the State
described the inapplicability of Miller by giving the defendant’s age down to the day. See
Brief for Appellee, Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (No. 3272 EDA 2012), 2013 WL 3858919, at *10
(“[T]he principles set forth in Miller only apply to defendants less than 18 years of age. . . .
[D]efendant was 19 years, 13 days [] old; when he committed the crimes for which he was
convicted.”).
104
Janvier, slip op. at 1–2.
105
See, e.g., Tercero v. Stephens, No. 13-70010, slip op. at 12 (5th Cir. Dec. 18, 2013)
(eighteen-year-old); In re Garner, 612 F. 3d 533, 534 (6th Cir. 2010) (nineteen-year-old);
Hosch v. Alabama, No. CR-10-0188, 2013 WL 5966906, at *64 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 8,
2013) (twenty-year-old); Thompson v. State, No. CR-05-0073, 2012 WL 520873, at *77–79
(Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2012) (eighteen-year-old); Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla.
2006) (twenty-three-year-old); Jean-Michel v. State, 96 So. 3d 1043, 1044–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012) (nineteen-year-old); State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810, 830 (La. 2008)
(eighteen-year-old); State v. Garcell, 678 S.E.2d 618, 645, 647 n.10 (N.C. 2009) (eighteenyear-old).
103
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that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18.”106
This Part presents three reasons why clinging to the bright line at
eighteen for mitigating punishment is inadequate. Holding the mitigating
factors of youth to be relevant only until age eighteen is inconsistent with,
and overextends, the very scientific and sociological data the Supreme
Court touts. Further, relying on the age of eighteen simply because
eighteen “is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood”107 inappropriately equates the right not
to be punished more severely than one deserves with affirmative rights to
engage in certain adult conduct. Finally, drawing a bright line at eighteen
and disregarding the characteristics of older youthful defendants fails to
serve any of the penological justifications that the Supreme Court has ruled
imperative for harsh and irrevocable sentences.
A. OVEREXTENDING THE DATA

The Court has eagerly espoused scientific and sociological data to
bolster its conclusions regarding what makes “juveniles” developmentally
and constitutionally different from “adults.” But the Court has been less
than eager to address the research’s inability to identify a precise point
when developmental maturity can be convincingly presumed for the entire
class of youth—even in the very data it cites. As one team of researchers
has lamented: “Unfortunately, judges, politicians, advocates, and journalists
are biased toward drawing a single line between adolescence and adulthood
for different purposes under the law that is at odds with developmental
cognitive neuroscience.”108
Examples from Miller and Roper demonstrate this point. Miller and
Roper both point to Professors Steinberg and Scott’s Less Guilty by Reason
of Adolescence as authority for the developmental differences between
106
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). In her Roper dissent, Justice
O’Connor took issue with the rule’s overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. See id. at
601–02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he age-based line . . . quite likely will protect a
number of offenders who are mature enough to deserve the death penalty and may well leave
vulnerable many who are not.”); see also Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of LineDrawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 259 (1989) (“If age
corresponded perfectly to the combination of relevant factors, then its use as a ‘bright line’
would not be problematic. Because age is not a ‘perfect’ proxy, however, its use as a ‘bright
line’ necessarily produces ordinal disproportionality, or comparative injustice.”).
107
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
108
B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 111, 122
(2008) (citation omitted). It was their hope to present research “to make strides in moving
this single line to multiple lines that consider developmental changes across both context
(emotionally charged or not) and time (in the moment or in the future).” Id.
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those under and those over eighteen.109 Yet, Professors Steinberg and Scott
explicitly note that research findings are “unlikely to ever be sufficiently
precise to draw a chronological age boundary” for acquiring adult
decisionmaking capacities.110 Further, some of the studies on which they
rely actually show development continuing beyond age eighteen.111 Miller
also relies on two briefs to suggest that the science supporting Roper’s and
Graham’s conclusions has “become even stronger.”112 While it is true that
those briefs point to additional research, that research hardly supports the
Court’s bright line. Quite the opposite: the brief from a group of
psychology professors notes how a youth’s brain “is not fully mature until
an individual reaches his or her twenties.”113 Compellingly, it points to
research from National Institute of Mental Health neuroscientist Jay Giedd,
who concluded that the parts of the brain linked to decisionmaking and
impulse inhibition do not fully develop until that time.114 The American
Psychological Association amici brief similarly notes how juveniles’
development continues throughout late adolescence and into young
adulthood.115 In describing such findings, the American Psychological

109

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra
note 62); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 570, 573 (same). In total, the majority in Roper cites
Professors Steinberg and Scott four times.
110
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 62, at 1016. Even though they acknowledged the
scientific imprecision for drawing a boundary, the psychologists advanced policy arguments
in support of one. For instance, they rejected a case-by-case approach for mitigation as an
unacceptable, “error-prone undertaking” when the stakes are life and death. See id. They
also advocated a boundary, even when it excluded potentially deserved youth, to avoid
practical inefficiencies and cases in which immaturity might be ignored due to particular
desires to impose punitive punishments. See id. For discussion of how a youthfulness
presumption could address these concerns, see infra Parts III.A.1 & III.B.2.
111
See, e.g., Steinberg & Scott, supra note 62, at 1012 (citing Elizabeth Cauffman &
Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be
Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741 (2000)). Cauffman and Steinberg
examined the relationship between age, psychosocial maturity, and antisocial
decisionmaking, finding that “the period between 16 and 19 marks an important transition
point in psychosocial development that is potentially relevant to debates about the drawing
of legal boundaries between adolescence and adulthood.” Cauffman & Steinberg, supra, at
756. For a thorough critique of the Supreme Court’s scientific pitfalls in Roper, see
generally Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 379 (2006).
112
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5.
113
Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber et al. in Support of Petitioners at 15–16,
Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (citations omitted).
114
Id. at 16 n.19 (citing Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the
Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 77, 83 (2004); see also supra note 61.
115
See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 5, 9, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647).
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Association skirts the binary “juvenile” and “adult” labels it originally set
out to apply.116
Recent psychological and sociological research further calls the
Court’s strict classifications of “juveniles” and “adults” into question.
Similar to how psychologist G. Stanley Hall identified a new life stage of
“adolescence” at the turn of the twentieth century,117 researchers today are
redefining young adulthood.118 Alluding to milestones that traditionally
defined the transition to adulthood,119 sociologists are charting the course of
a “changing timetable” for development.120 Leading that charge is Jeffrey
Arnett, the same psychologist and research professor cited in Roper who
has since marshaled support for a new stage of life lasting from the late

116

See id. at 6 n.3. The error is understandable: “Adulthood,” “adolescence,” and “early
adulthood” have no clear definitional parameters, and researchers often prescribe different
labels. See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8174, 8174 (describing
“adolescence and early adulthood” as encompassing ages seventeen to nineteen but also
describing as “children and adolescents” a sample of people ages four to twenty-one).
Compare Casey et al., supra note 108, at 117 fig.4 (showing measures in a bar graph for
“adolescents” (ages thirteen to seventeen) and “adults” (ages twenty-three to twenty-nine)),
with id. at 118 fig.5 (showing a measure in a scatterplot for “adults” (ages eighteen to
thirty)).
117
In 1904, G. Stanley Hall published his two-volume magnum opus on what was then
considered a new life stage, adolescence. G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS
PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME,
RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1904).
118
This period of young adulthood—subjected to many labels, such as “adultescence,”
“extended adolescence,” and “youthhood”—has become the subject of much interest. See
Kay S. Hymowitz, Where Have the Good Men Gone?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2011, at C1;
Hope Reese, Yes, 20-Somethings Are Taking Longer to Grow Up—but Why?, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 30, 2012, 12:52 PM), http://goo.gl/FS0muB; see also Lev Grossman, Grow Up? Not
So Fast, TIME, Jan. 16, 2005, at 43; Press Release, MacArthur Foundation, Interdisciplinary
Research on the Transition to Adulthood (Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://goo.gl/7U7Vbz
(announcing a $5.2 million grant in support of research “examining the new challenges
facing young people, ages 18 to 34”).
119
See JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE
LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES, at v (2004) (noting how sociologists define the
transition to adulthood in terms of young people finishing school, entering full-time work,
getting married, and becoming parents); see also JENNIFER M. SILVA, COMING UP SHORT:
WORKING-CLASS ADULTHOOD IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 6 (2013). For a suggestion of
“new” adult milestones, see Sue Shellenbarger, New Ways to Gauge What Grown-Up
Means, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2013, at D3.
120
See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., On the Frontier of Adulthood: Emerging Themes
and New Directions, in ON THE FRONTIER OF ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 3, 5 (Richard A. Settersten, Jr. et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter ON THE FRONTIER]; see
also Robin Marantz Henig, What Is It About 20-Somethings?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 22,
2010, at 28.
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teens through the mid- to late twenties—“emerging adulthood.”121 Among
the trends on which Professor Arnett and others rely, young people are
putting off marriage.122 In fact, the timing of marriage has unprecedentedly
shifted into older ages in recent years.123 Young people are also living with
their parents longer and with greater frequency.124 When they do not live
with their parents, they are still unlikely to have families of their own.125
As a result, by choice or circumstance,126 young people are forestalling the
beginning of traditionally “adult” life. To impose Roper, Graham, and
Miller language, they appear to lack the degree of maturity that previous
generations of adults commanded, they still seem vulnerable to outside
pressures, and their characters remain not very “well-formed.”127
Some of the stimuli behind the delay in adulthood are unsurprising:
Americans’ views toward young people’s sexual relationships have

121

See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Susan Taber, Adolescence Terminable and Interminable:
When Does Adolescence End?, 23 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 517, 534 (1994) (coining the
phrase). See generally ARNETT, supra note 119; EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF
AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006);
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 469 (2000). Professor Arnett’s term “emerging
adulthood” seems to have taken off, while previous characterizations, such as “the postponed
generation” or “incompletely-launched young adults,” have not. In fact, a multidisciplinary,
international research organization dedicated to the study of “emerging adulthood” has
formed.
See About SSEA, SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF EMERGING ADULTHOOD,
http://goo.gl/BU2FPB (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
122
See ARNETT, supra note 119, at 4–5; SILVA, supra note 119, at 6.
123
See Erin Migdol, Delaying Marriage Has Serious Consequences for Some, New
Research Reveals, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://goo.gl/Pxgscd
(describing how the average ages for marriage have never been higher than they are now for
women (26.5) and men (28.7)); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST
MARRIAGE BY SEX: 1890 TO 2013, at fig.MS-2 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/RwBjwl.
124
See RICHARD FRY, PEW RES. CTR., A RISING SHARE OF YOUNG ADULTS LIVE IN THEIR
PARENTS’ HOME 11 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/BJUVGS; see also Robert F. Schoeni
& Karen E. Ross, Material Assistance from Families During the Transition to Adulthood, in
ON THE FRONTIER, supra note 120, at 396, 413 (“In 1990, 70% of eighteen-year-olds lived
with their parents, falling to 30% by age twenty-four and to 10% by age thirty. Between
1970 and 1990 there was a monotonic rise in shared housing. Between the ages of twenty
and twenty-six, there was a roughly 10 percentage point rise in the share of children living at
home.”).
125
See Elizabeth Fussell & Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The Transition to Adulthood
During the Twentieth Century: Race, Nativity, and Gender, in ON THE FRONTIER, supra note
120, at 29, 31, 33 fig.2.3, 58.
126
For critiques of the millennial generation as self-absorbed and needlessly coddled,
see, for example, Jeffrey Zaslow, The Coddling Crisis: Why Americans Think Adulthood
Begins at Age 26, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at D1; 60 Minutes: The Millennials Are Coming
(CBS television broadcast May 25, 2008), available at http://goo.gl/HFIhlo.
127
See ARNETT, supra note 119, at 6, 8–9.
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changed.128 More people are pursuing higher education.129 And a sluggish
job market and burdensome student loan debt have otherwise stalled buying
homes and starting families.130 The legal implications of such a delay,
however, are less than clear. For this reason, the Court’s continued reliance
on a categorical line at age eighteen to divide the supposedly scientifically
and sociologically mature from the immature for mitigating punishment is
troubling. The research on which the Court relies does not support such a
line, and additional research suggests that the relevant youthful qualities
continue to materialize in individuals into their twenties.
Even though the Court invoked science and sociological data to
support its Roper, Graham, and Miller holdings, it makes sense, then, that
the Court turned to more a conventional analysis in its rare attempt to
justify the line.131 In this way, the Court suggests that its developmental
analysis for punishment applies only within the bounds of previously
existing legal conceptions of childhood and adulthood.132 The following
Part demonstrates the asymmetry in such an approach.

128

See id. at 5.
See id. at 5–6; see also Furstenberg, Jr. et al., supra note 120, at 3, 6.
130
See Shellenbarger, supra note 119; see also Derek Thompson, Adulthood, Delayed:
What Has the Recession Done to Millennials?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:00 AM),
http://goo.gl/0OJgSB.
131
Recall the Court reasoned that although “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles
from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18 . . . [t]he age of 18 is the point
where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.” Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); see also Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the
Courts: The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4 (1991) (“Because
judges are trained in the law and are generally unfamiliar with psychology’s research
methodology and statistics, they are naturally more inclined to rely on legal scholarship and
precedent when they make their decisions. The differences in training and approaches to
scholarship make communication between the two disciplines difficult.”).
132
See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 144–45 (2009) (“[T]he impact of adolescent brain
science on juvenile justice has been strongly cabined by the extrinsic reality of legal
doctrine. . . . [D]octrinal forces are so entrenched and of such broad applicability within
criminal law, adolescent brain science is inadequate to provoke deep change, at least within
the courts.”). The dissents in Roper argue that the other Justices’ independent moral
judgment about youth culpability—and not science—is the fulcrum on which the judgment
turns. Justice O’Connor recognized that the rule decreed by the Court “rests, ultimately, on
its independent moral judgment that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any
17-year-old offender.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 588 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Additionally,
Justice Scalia wrote that “[o]f course, the real force driving today’s decision is . . . the
Court’s own judgment that murderers younger than 18 can never be as morally culpable as
older counterparts.” Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
129
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B. CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT NOT COMPARABLE TO AFFIRMATIVE
RIGHTS TO ENGAGE IN “ADULT” CONDUCT

A categorical rule mitigating punishment based on youthfulness only
for those under eighteen is additionally inadequate because it fails to
recognize the exceptionality of criminal punishment compared to other
contexts of the law where bright-line classifications pervade. States
undoubtedly draw bright-line rules to regulate the age at which young
people can vote,133 serve on juries,134 marry,135 drive,136 gamble,137 and
drink.138 Young people similarly have age-based rights to enter into
contracts139 and choose how doctors may treat them.140 These categorical
rules granting individuals affirmative rights over their conduct amount to
“crude determination[s]” that young people of certain ages are mature
enough to act in society, in some respects, as adults.141 Young people can
test out certain adult privileges, in spite of the special risks of the learning
periods involved.142
The Court since Roper, however, has conflated this area of granting
affirmative rights to young people to try out adult activity with criminal
punishment. Unlike other laws that regulate behavior, criminal punishment
involves finding people morally blameworthy. Andrew von Hirsch has
explained that punishment is different from other government-generated

133

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment guarantees eighteen-year-olds the right to vote, U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, and almost every state recognizes a voting age of eighteen, see
Roper, 543 U.S. at 581 app. B.
134
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 583 app. C.
135
See id. at 585 app. D.
136
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 842 app. C (1988) (“Most States have
various provisions regulating driving age, from learner’s permits through driver’s licenses.
In all States but one, 15-year-olds either may not drive, or may drive only with parental
consent or accompaniment.”).
137
See id. at 847 app. F.
138
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 22(d); ALA. CODE § 28-1-5 (LexisNexis 2013); 235
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-16 (West 2013); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65(1)
(McKinney 2011); 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493(1) (West Supp. 2013); TEX. ALCO.
BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.03 (West Supp. 2013).
139
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-5(b) (LexisNexis 2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6700 (West
2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/242 (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.056 (West
2000); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-101(1) (McKinney 2012).
140
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West
2013); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/1 (West 2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504
(McKinney 2012); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10101.1 (West 2012); see also Elizabeth S.
Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
28, at 113, 120.
141
See Scott, supra note 141, at 120.
142
See ZIMRING, supra note 38, at 72 (noting such activities as driving).
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benefits because its defining characteristic includes state censure.143 When
the state finds people blameworthy, “the requirement of equal treatment
becomes much stronger” because unequal treatment implies that they are
unequally blameworthy.144 Drawing a bright line between those who are
under and over eighteen for mitigating punishment thus implies they are
unequally blameworthy, even though they might possess the same
developmental traits that render them less culpable. The Roper, Graham,
and Miller decisions applied to those over eighteen therefore overlook the
important and unique goals for imposing criminal punishment of treating
equally culpable offenders equally and making individualized inquiries of
culpability for society’s harshest punishments.145
In the capital punishment context, the need for an individualized
inquiry to measure a person’s blameworthiness is hardly a new concept.
Lockett v. Ohio recognized that individualized decisions are essential in
capital cases, fearing that the death penalty might be imposed “in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”146 Eddings v. Oklahoma
then highlighted the obligation of sentencing judges and juries to consider
youthful defendants’ mental and emotional development as part of their
calculi.147 As the Eddings Court stated, “youth is more than a chronological
fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”148 After Roper,
however, these decisions have had little meaning for offenders just over
eighteen. Those whose mental and emotional development is slowed likely
face greater burdens in proving youthfulness as a mitigating circumstance.
143
See Andrew von Hirsch, Selective Incapacitation Reexamined: The National
Academy of Sciences’ Report on Criminal Careers and “Career Criminals,” 7 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 19, 27 (1988).
144
See id.
145
Some children’s rights advocates fear that criminal legal developments that do not
recognize the differences between criminal law and other decisionmaking contexts might
undermine youth autonomy. See Buss, supra note 46, at 43–44. Such fears are reasonable,
given that developmental discoveries about youth immaturity have had implications beyond
the realm of criminal sentencing. For example, proponents and opponents of a woman’s
ability to have an abortion have used the science. See Scott, supra note 140, at 569–76; see
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing scientific
evidence presented in the sentencing and abortion contexts). Advocates seeking to prevent
alcohol abuse and binge drinking among college students have likewise adopted its thrust.
See Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and the College Drinker: Biological Basis of
Propensity to Use and Misuse Alcohol, COLLEGE DRINKING—CHANGING THE CULTURE (last
reviewed Sept. 23, 2005), http://goo.gl/pTgugW.
146
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also id. (“The nonavailablility of
corrective or modifying mechanisms . . . underscore[] the need for individualized
consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.”).
147
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982).
148
Id. at 115.
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Because they are beyond the Court’s zone of Eighth Amendment
protection, lower courts are unwilling to entertain arguments for lessened
culpability based on developmental differences.149
In the noncapital punishment context, the Court has only recently
recognized that young people’s blameworthiness must be measured with
individualized inquiries. Miller held that the especially harsh penalty of life
without parole now requires individualized culpability inquiries for those
under eighteen.150 The reasons that make life without parole especially
harsh for those under eighteen, however, also apply to marginally older
offenders. Just as life without parole deprives a seventeen-year-old
offender of “the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration,”151
so too does it deprive an eighteen-year-old of that meaningful hope. If it is
true that “[m]ost fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in
determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the
possibility of parole,”152 then the youthfulness of a marginally older
offender for whom the sentence would be equally harsh must also be
considered.
C. UNDERMINING PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS

Finally, the Court’s current scheme disregards the same proportional
punishment fundamentals that it touts. Each of the Court’s line-drawing
decisions has highlighted how diminished culpability impairs penological
justifications for punishment.153 While acknowledging that the Eighth
Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one particular penological
theory, the Court has noted that a sentence must be supported by some
justification.154 Yet, for youthful defendants’ irrevocable sentences, the
Court has ruled out retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. This Section addresses these justifications and describes
149

See supra notes 103 and 105, and accompanying text.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
151
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
152
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
153
See id. at 2465–66; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 571–72 (2005).
154
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. The Graham Court noted that “[t]he concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 2021. Other Justices, however,
do not believe that the Eighth Amendment authorizes courts “to invalidate any punishment
they deem disproportionate to the severity of the crime or to a particular class of offenders.”
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Proportionality—the notion that the
punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution.”); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 989 (1991).
150
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why each could similarly be inapplicable to a defendant between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-five.
1. Retribution
In Graham and Roper, the Court considered whether retribution was a
legitimate reason to severely punish offenders under eighteen. Retribution,
described as “the interest in seeing that the offender gets his ‘just
deserts,’”155 is intimately concerned with the offender’s personal
culpability.156 Whether retribution is viewed as a means to express
community moral outrage or to right a victim’s wrong, the Roper Court
noted that the case for retribution is weakened when the defendant is
young.157 According to the Court, “[r]etribution is not proportional if the
law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth
and immaturity.”158 In Graham, the Court extended the same logic to
young people sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses.159
Retribution, the Court stated, “does not justify imposing the second most
severe penalty on the less culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”160
None of these considerations is unique to those under eighteen. Young
people aged eighteen to twenty-five can similarly have lessened moral
culpability and blameworthiness as a result of their youth and immaturity.
The developmental characteristics attendant to youth continue beyond the
age of eighteen, and the normative concern for establishing an age at which
society may reasonably demand people to be “adult” is not sacrificed by
recognizing that some individuals have not yet attained full developmental
maturity by that point. Furthermore, terms of life imprisonment remain
comparatively harsh for those just over eighteen who grow old behind bars,
spending the prime of their lives incarcerated.
2. Deterrence
The Court in Roper and Graham similarly rejected deterrence as a
justification. Deterrence can be described as the general interest in
preventing prospective offenders’ similar crimes.161 Outside the capital
155

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (“[T]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender.” (citation omitted)).
157
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
158
Id.
159
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29.
160
Id.
161
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
156
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punishment context, deterrence can also reflect the specific interest in
preventing the particular offender from reoffending.162 For both sorts,
“deterrence must operate (if at all) through the potential offenders’ minds,
so it is essential that they know about the severity of the probable sentence
[and] take this into account when deciding whether to offend . . . .”163 In
Roper, the Court suggested that the same characteristics that make young
offenders less culpable than adults also make them less susceptible to
deterrence.164 In Graham, the Court further teased out this reasoning,
stating that young people’s immaturity and impetuousness make them less
likely to consider possible punishment when they make decisions,
especially when that punishment is rarely imposed.165 It additionally ruled
out any limited deterrent effect that life that without parole has on
nonhomicide offenders, noting how any such effect is outweighed by how
disproportionate the punishment is.166
Again, this logic is hardly limited to offenders under eighteen. The
same characteristics that make those under eighteen less likely to consider
possible punishment when they act can also be present in those aged
eighteen to twenty-five. If an offender cannot understand and appreciate
the severity of an irrevocable sentence when he decides to offend, his
sentence loses deterrent value. While such sentences may still have some
general deterrent value for other prospective offenders, it remains that they
must not be grossly disproportionate to the offender against whom they are
imposed. Thus, depending on their crimes, some young people aged
eighteen to twenty-five might have such diminished moral responsibility
that any limited deterrent effect on prospective offenders that would be
gained from the young people’s irrevocable sentences would not justify
imposing those sentences.
3. Incapacitation
The Court in Graham also added and rejected the justification of
incapacitation. Incapacitation is said to protect the public and make
offenders incapable of reoffending.167 The Graham Court recognized that
incapacitation can satisfy concerns regarding public safety, but it
determined that relating such a justification to young offenders required the
assumption that they could be ongoing dangers.168 Because the non-fixed
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 79 (5th ed. 2010).
Id.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–72 (2005).
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29.
See id.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 162, at 84.
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
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nature of young people’s characters makes such an assumption
questionable, the Court ruled out that possibility.169 Relying on Roper, it
noted that even “expert psychologists” have trouble differentiating between
young offenders who succumb to “unfortunate yet transient immaturity”
and those “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”170
The same reasoning can make the incapacitation justification
inapplicable to young adults. Just as incorrigibility is inconsistent with
youth under eighteen,171 so too might it be inconsistent with some youth
over eighteen. Personality disorders can generally be diagnosed in young
people over eighteen,172 but “[u]sing a chronological age to demarcate the
stage [in which such diagnoses are appropriate] can present difficulties as
young people of the same chronological age may differ greatly in their
levels of developmental maturity.”173 Research likewise shows that young
people’s identities continue to form substantially beyond eighteen.174
4. Rehabilitation
Finally, the Court has concluded that a fourth goal, rehabilitation,
could not justify irrevocable punishments for young offenders. Although
“the concept of rehabilitation is imprecise” and remains the subject of
substantial dialogue,175 the rehabilitative approach generally concerns itself
with the perceived needs of the offender rather than with the gravity of the
crime.176 As a result, the aim is to treat the offender and provide the

169

See id.
Id. at 2026.
171
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (citations omitted).
172
BRUCE J. COHEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 504 (2003) (“Since
children’s personalities are still subject to change at least into their young adulthoods, most
clinicians are circumspect about diagnosing personality disorder in individuals under the age
of 18.”).
173
See NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY
DISORDER: TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 348 (2009) (discussing borderline personality
disorder).
174
See Waterman, supra note 51, at 355; see also Jennifer Lynn Tanner & Jeffrey Jensen
Arnett, The Emergence of ‘Emerging Adulthood’: The New Life Stage Between Adolescence
and Young Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTHOOD: NEW
PERSPECTIVES AND AGENDAS 39, 42 (Andy Furlong ed., 2009) (“Emerging adulthood is an
age period during which there is stronger potential for personality change compared to
earlier and later decades.”). Tanner and Arnett note that people’s personalities over the
period from adolescence through emerging adulthood “tend to make gains in forcefulness
and decisiveness; . . . show increases in self-control, reflecting tendencies to become more
reflective, deliberate and planful; and decrease in negative emotionality, including
aggressiveness and alienation.” Id. (citation omitted).
175
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
176
See ASHWORTH, supra note 162, at 86.
170
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education or skills necessary to reduce his risk of reoffending.177 In
Graham, the Court held that life imprisonment without parole could not be
justified by rehabilitation because “the penalty forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.”178 Denying young offenders reentry to the community,
according to the Court, requires making permanent judgments about their
value and place in society—inappropriate in light of young offenders’
“capacity for change and limited moral culpability.”179
This justification can be also rejected on a similar basis for some
young adults. Those young people who have the same capacity for change
and the same limited moral culpability as seventeen-year-olds should not be
forsworn from potential rehabilitation simply because they are older than
eighteen.
Because Roper, Graham, and Miller recognized that penological goals
cannot justify irrevocable sentences when offenders possess certain
characteristics of youthfulness, it follows that the penological goals also
cannot be met when other young people exhibit the same characteristics.
Sentences prescribing death, life in prison without parole for nonhomicide
offenses, or mandatory life in prison without parole also would be
disproportionate for youthful offenders who are merely of a slightly higher
age. Punishment for both groups of offenders should be prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
To this point, this Comment has focused on illustrating the
inadequacy of drawing a bright line at eighteen for mitigating society’s
harshest punishments. This Part offers a potential remedy: extending
sentencing mitigation to those young adults under twenty-five who would
otherwise similarly be deemed less responsible under the scheme of
justifications the Court has set forth, absent the Court’s firm grip on
chronological age.
A. PRESUMPTION OF YOUTHFULNESS

A presumption scheme would better serve criminal sentencing
purposes, appreciating age yet refusing to be wholly bound by years and
days. Roper, Graham, and Miller’s bright line should be transformed into a
scheme in which defendants under the age of eighteen are irrebuttably
presumed to possess the youthful characteristics that mandate reduced
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, while defendants up to the age
177
178
179

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
Id.
See id.
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of twenty-five can seek, but are not guaranteed, the same protection.
Gradating based on age in this way imports into the modern era the early
common law focus on punishing offenders based on the strength of their
understanding and judgment.180
1. Mandatory and Irrebuttable for Defendants Under Eighteen
Under such a remedy, sentencing for defendants who were under
eighteen at the time of their crimes would not change. A mandatory,
irrebuttable presumption would still be afforded to those under eighteen so
that they would not face society’s most severe punishments of death, life
imprisonment for nonhomicide offenses, or mandatory life without parole.
The costs of discontinuing this protection, as the Roper Court
understood,181 are great. The sentencing judge or jury, prejudiced by the
particular crime details, could succumb to arguments contrary to
developmental fact and find youth to be aggravating. Even offering up the
youthfulness factors and asking the sentencing judge or jury to apply them
for those under eighteen on a case-by-case basis would be insufficient for
this group, given the level of discretion incumbent in such an analysis.
Prosecutors could appeal to the undercurrent in public consciousness that
youthful offenders are uniquely threatening.182 They have made these
arguments in the past, suggesting that crimes committed during youth are
predictive of future dangerousness,183 and jurors have believed them.184
Although some acts committed by those under eighteen are heinous
and are “not just the acts of happy-go-lucky teenagers,” as Justice Scalia
contended in Roper,185 the fact remains that the people who committed
180

See supra notes 16–27 and accompanying text. Whereas early determinations
focused on culpability as it related to capacity, this scheme prioritizes responsibility.
181
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (“An unacceptable likelihood exists
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe
than death.”).
182
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age
Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 76.
183
See id. at 77; see also supra note 43. Note that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Roper found this tendency problematic, see 543 U.S. at 573–74, and Justice O’Connor
deemed a prosecutor’s attempt to argue youth to be aggravating as “troubling,” id. at 603.
184
See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ.
263, 321 & n.313 (2013) (“Surveys of jurors report that the heinousness of a crime
invariably trumped a youth’s immaturity.”).
185
Roper, 543 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2051–52 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting how the rarity of a sixteen-year-old
sentenced to life without parole corresponded to his crime’s rare brutality).
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those acts are still teenagers. Given what researchers now know about
young people, the potential split-focus between the crime’s depravity and
the defendant’s unique sensibilities should be permanently resolved in a
manner that concentrates on the young defendant. Psychologists and
scientists have found enough evidence to decisively establish that young
people, as a class, are generally different.186 The cruelty in subjecting that
entire class to society’s harshest punishments simply to castigate the rare,
extraordinarily mature defendant does not warrant abrogating protection for
those under eighteen.187 Whereas common law held that offenders younger
than seven deserved categorical special protection,188 that age should now
be eighteen.
2. Permissive and Rebuttable for Defendants Up to Age Twenty-Five
Still, like candle flickers that outlast a birthday blow, youthfulness
does not always disappear when an offender turns eighteen. Youthful
defendants up to the age of twenty-five189 should therefore have the
opportunity to seek mitigation. Defendants could argue that their
youthfulness excludes society’s harshest penalties as cruel and unjust.190
They would have to reasonably show—like the younger defendants
protected by Roper, Graham, and Miller—that they (1) lacked maturity and
had an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) were vulnerable to
negative influences and had limited control over their environment, and
(3) lacked characters that could be rehabilitated. This showing would
unravel the irrevocable punishments’ penological goals and preclude courts
from imposing them under the Eighth Amendment. Unlike mitigation for
younger defendants, however, the burden would then shift to the
prosecution, which could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendants were sufficiently mature to be punished according to the
legislature’s design. The prosecution could undermine the defendants’
evidence or introduce new evidence showcasing the offenders’ culpability,
not the crimes’ grievousness.
A preponderance of the evidence standard, and not beyond a
reasonable doubt, would be the appropriate burden for prosecutors to meet
in disclaiming an eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old defendant’s assertion of

186

See supra Part I.B.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.
188
See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
189
For a discussion about the endpoint of twenty-five, see infra Part III.B.1.
190
Due to its potential impact on plea bargaining, any determination regarding a
defendant’s eligibility for irrevocable punishments should precede the guilt phase of a trial.
187

2014]

EXTENDING SENTENCING MITIGATION

699

youthfulness.191 It would harmonize the interests in respecting legislative
determinations of appropriate punishment while avoiding punishing
legitimately youthful offenders unjustifiably. It would further retain some
of the value in criminal law, not just as a reflector of actual human
behavior, but also as a system of rules that suggests its ideal, aspirational
expression. Criminal law, after all, not only censures; in so doing, it
bestows positive, societal norms. If prosecutors could prove that a
defendant, more likely than not, actually did not possess the characteristics
that warrant mitigation, then the full spectrum of legislatively prescribed
sentences would be available. But if prosecutors failed to contradict a
youthfulness showing, more likely than not, then they could not subject the
defendant to the harshest penalties. The court would determine both
whether the defendant reasonably demonstrated his youthfulness and
whether the prosecution rebutted the defendant’s showing by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Such a permissive, rebuttable youthfulness presumption would
certainly alter schemes presuming criminal defendants to have the requisite
responsibility to be held culpable. It might likewise raise uncertainties
about the legal dichotomy between juvenile and criminal courts for older
offenders. But, without requiring legislators to overhaul penal codes, this
proposal would effectuate the meaning of Roper, Graham, and Miller.
B. ADDRESSING CONCERNS

With the contours of this remedy established, a number of questions
emerge. For example, why should the presumption be limited to those
under the age of twenty-five?
Would imposing the presumption
unnecessarily burden courts? Additionally, would allowing this level of
judicial discretion invite uncertainty and unwarranted inconsistency? The
following Sections address these issues.
1. Simply a Delayed Bright Line?
The first and most obvious critique of this remedy is the way it
advocates a solution it seemingly opposes: drawing a somewhat arbitrary,
albeit delayed, bright line. Drawing a line at twenty-five, however, is more
191

Before Roper, Graham, and Miller, Professor Stephen Morse discussed a similar
rebuttable presumption scheme but suggested that “[f]airness and efficiency should require
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular adolescent was fully
responsible.” Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 63 (1997). He contended that such a high burden was necessary for cases
involving defendants on the margin “in a system that prefers incorrect attributions of
innocence (or lesser culpability) to incorrect attributions of guilt (or greater culpability).” Id.
at 63–64.
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appropriate than eighteen for several reasons. To be sure, a line at twentyfive comes closer to the science the Court touts. Recall that neuroscientific
evidence previously before the Court proved that a youth’s brain is not fully
mature until an individual’s twenties.192 More recent sociological and
psychological evidence continues to support such a finding.193 For
example, as a result of mounting evidence, child psychologists in Britain
issued new guidelines in September 2013 “directing clinicians to reconsider
how they view patients in younger adulthood” and treat those up to age
twenty-five.194 A line at twenty-five would also better heed the Court’s
concerns regarding the impact of youthfulness on retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.195 As previously demonstrated, courts
risk imposing unjust, unequal punishment when marginally older
defendants can be censured more harshly than their younger counterparts,
even though both groups possess the same culpability-reducing traits.
Drawing a line at twenty-five, and not some later age, additionally
retains the Court’s focus on the particular disproportionality of life
imprisonment without parole for younger defendants. As the Graham
Court recognized, “[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh punishment
for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult.”196
This sentiment rings true for those defendants marginally older than
eighteen. If a defendant is older than twenty-five, however, the validity of
youth-based rebuttals to life imprisonment diminish. Indeed, if defendants
are not fully developed by age twenty-five, their available recourse should
perhaps not be a youthfulness presumption. It could be a developmental
disability defense.197

192

See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.
194
Matthew Mientka, Adulthood Extended to Age 25 by Child Psychologists in UK,
MEDICAL DAILY (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://goo.gl/8JDJCf; see also Lucy Wallis, Is 25
the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013, 5:52 PM),
http://goo.gl/ZRQ9ZV.
195
See supra Part II.C.
196
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
197
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (“[C]linical definitions of mental
retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant
limitations in adaptive skills . . . . Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments,
however, by definition they have diminished capacities . . . .”). The differences between a
developmental disability defense and a youthfulness presumption are much starker than the
ages for which they are applicable: the former reflects a defendant’s diminished culpability
as a result of transitory qualities. The latter reflects both a defendant’s permanent
diminished capacity and his resulting diminished culpability.
193
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2. Sacrificing Judicial Efficiency?
A second critique of the presumption remedy is the burden it would
impose on courts, requiring them to evaluate a new class of defendants’
youthfulness, case-by-case.
Evaluating a defendant’s youthfulness,
however, is already mandated for society’s harshest penalties under the
Eighth Amendment. Eddings required courts to consider youthfulness
before they could impose capital punishment.198 Miller required courts to
similarly consider youthfulness when defendants under eighteen face life
imprisonment without parole.199 Where Eddings additionally stated that
“youth is more than a chronological fact,”200 this Comment’s presumption
scheme would ensure that youth amounts to more than a chronological fact
in those situations where life imprisonment amounts to capital
punishment.201 In this way, the presumption scheme closes the Eighth
Amendment loop fashioned from conjunctive readings of Eddings, Roper,
Graham, and Miller.
Even if Eighth Amendment case law does not require this youthfulness
inquiry, the interest in fair, proportional sentences demands it and offsets
any added judicial burden.
Outside the sentencing context, such
individualized determinations often would be irrational. For example,
requiring courts to decide whether every seventeen-year-old is mature
enough to vote would “greatly outweigh whatever injustice might be
produced by the use of a bright line minimum voting age.”202 When
unjustified punishment is the countervailing injustice, however, the interest
in judicial efficiency hardly compares.203 Indeed, the injustice that stems
from sentencing equally youthful defendants to significantly harsher
punishments must require individualized youthfulness determinations—in
spite of efficiency interests.204 The Supreme Court has held that
198

See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
200
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
201
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
202
See Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 281–82. See generally supra Part II.B.
203
While police procedure and criminal sentencing are imperfect analogs, the Court in
J.D.B. v. North Carolina recognized the need to carve out age as an exception to an
otherwise objective Miranda rule. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2407 (2011). In response to the State’s
argument that a child’s age must be excluded from the custody analysis “to preserve clarity,”
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the Court has rejected a “more easily administered line,
recognizing that it would simply enable the police to circumvent the constraints on custodial
interrogations established by Miranda.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the sentencing context, however, the Court’s bright line at age eighteen arguably enables
some judges and juries to circumvent Eighth Amendment constraints on punishment.
204
Commentators such as Professor Feld have previously recognized the burden that
mitigating sentences based on youth might impose on courts. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 23,
199
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youthfulness diminishes culpability.
Imposing fair, proportional
punishment requires the same youthfulness consideration for defendants
who are merely days or years older.
3. Inviting Uncertainty and Unwarranted Sentencing Inconsistency?
Finally, this remedy can be criticized for inviting uncertainty and
unwarranted sentencing inconsistencies for defendants aged eighteen to
twenty-five. Thankfully, however, the Court has provided lower courts
with a sufficient framework that can permit individualized sentencing and
avoid unfair disparities.205 In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court offered
and strengthened three factors that make youth less culpable under the
Eighth Amendment.206 In so doing, the Court provided a guide for lower
courts evaluating whether defendants between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five warrant youthfulness presumptions. The youthfulness cases
encourage lower courts to consider evidence of an offender’s (1) lack of
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) vulnerability to
negative influences and limited control over their environment, and (3) lack
of characters that can be rehabilitated.
Sentencing judges or juries in both state and federal courts could rely
on these factors similarly to how federal district courts use Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. The advisory Guidelines create a baseline for
sentencing without sacrificing judicial fact-finding.207 The youthfulness
factors could likewise provide a consistent baseline for addressing eighteento twenty-five-year-olds’ youthfulness claims. When courts address
offender characteristics “in a reasonably consistent manner,” according to
at 122 (“[F]or ease of administration, age alone provides the most useful criterion upon
which to allocate mitigation”). In part for this reason, Professor Feld has proposed a “youth
discount” in which sentences would be reduced according to age. Id. at 122–23; see also
Feld, supra note 184, at 325–27 & n.328 (describing supporters of the “youth discount”
principle). Professor Feld has argued that his approach “avoids the conceptual and
administrative difficulties of a more encompassing subjective inquiry.” Feld, supra note 23,
at 122. This Comment rejects Professor Feld’s age-based approach, siding instead with
reasoning offered by Professor Morse, who asked, “Should not efficiency yield to the need to
individualize for the small class of adults with the same characteristics as juveniles who
therefore might not be responsible?” Morse, supra note 191, at 64; see also id. at 59 (“[W]e
must very carefully identify why adolescents might be treated differently, and if fairness
requires differential treatment for the class, it also requires that adults with the same
responsibility diminishing characteristics should be treated equally.”).
205
This Comment asserts that the Court has identified relevant factors for subsequent
courts to consider when evaluating the blameworthiness of young adults. But see Feld,
supra note 184, at 321–22.
206
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).
207
See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
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the Guidelines, they “help secure nationwide consistency, avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, provide certainty and fairness, and
promote respect for the law.”208
Moreover, the case law understanding of youthfulness actually
constrains federal judicial discretion to a greater degree than the Sentencing
Commission envisioned. The Guidelines’ section on age provides that
“[a]ge (including youth) may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted, if considerations based on age, individually or in
combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual
degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the
guidelines.”209 If judges track Eighth Amendment case law to define
“youth,” they would have even more characteristics to study.
Across courts, this expanded inquiry regarding youthfulness could
curtail discretion and inconsistency, and the Guidelines’ nondescript
“youth” could be given new meaning for defendants under twenty-five
facing capital punishment or life imprisonment for nonhomicide crimes.
Although this Comment does not define the factors’ exact application, the
Court has not otherwise required detailed remedies. For example, the Court
has left for states to determine the appropriate ways to enforce
constitutional restrictions against executing both mentally retarded and
insane individuals.210 This presumption remedy simply gives courts new
lenses through which to view evidence that many already are required to
gather.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has demonstrated three reasons why the current
approach of recognizing the mitigating effect of youthfulness only when
defendants are under eighteen years old cannot stand. If the solution to
address the increasingly punitive orientation of criminal justice remains one
of protecting youthful defendants through the Eighth Amendment, then
courts must also consider defendants’ youthfulness when eighteen- to
twenty-five-year-olds face irrevocable sentences. Because the Court
continues to insist that developmental differences lessen culpability and
negate all penological justifications for imposing society’s harshest
208
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2012) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), available at http://goo.gl/cyilMw.
209
Id. § 5H1.1.
210
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)). For a discussion about how the Court’s approach has
resulted in a myriad of procedures, see Allison Freedman, Note, Mental Retardation and the
Death Penalty: The Need for an International Standard Defining Mental Retardation, 12
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 8–9 (2014).
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sanctions, marginally older and equally blameless offenders must be able to
seek the same protection from them. A permissive, rebuttable presumption
of youthfulness would accomplish this goal. Indeed, as the Court has
suggested, “making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant” to the
imposition of the harshest and irrevocable sentences “poses too great a risk
of disproportionate punishment.”211
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See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

